The paper presents a constructive interpretation for proofs in classical logic of 0 1 sentences and for a witness extraction procedure based on Prawitz's reduction rules.
Introduction
Cut-elimination theorems play a fundamental rôle in Proof Theory. Many relevant properties of logics can be derived from them. In particular, for intuitionistic logic, cut-elimination allows you to \compute" with proofs. In fact, the constructive contents of an intuitionistic proof can be made explicit by eliminating its cuts. In the natural deduction version of intuitionistic logic 8] cut-elimination corresponds to normalizability of proofs, i.e. to the possibility of getting rid of any detour by means of suitable reduction rules (a detour is an application of an introduction rule for a connective immediately followed by its corresponding elimination rule.) Such reduction rules preserve the well-known functional interpretation of intuitionistic connectives and proofs which Brouwer, Heyting, Kolmogorov and others proposed in order to allow a better understanding of the constructive features of intuitionistic logic (BHK interpretation) 6] 4]. Since irreducible proofs explicitly represent mathematical constructions, reduction rules for intuitionistic logic turn out to have a computational meaning.
The BHK interpretation was also helpful to the development of typed functional languages and of computer science in general, for instance through the so called Curry-Howard analogy. The understanding of intuitionistic logic provided by the BHK interpretation also enabled the development of simple and comprehensible procedures of program extraction from formal constructive proofs. Such procedures, at the very beginning of their development some thirty years ago, were extremely involved. By interpreting the implication as a function space constructor it was possible to interpret a proof of the proposition (type) A ! B as a recursive map from proofs of proposition (type) A to those of B, and the reduction rule for implication in terms of the -rule for -calculus.
One of the main results you can get from the cut-elimination theorem for intuitionistic logic, and hence from normalizability in natural deduction, is the consistency of the logical system. In the natural deduction for classical logic, instead, you cannot get any consistency from normalizability, unless the set of reduction rules for intuitionistic logic is suitably extended. So Prawitz added to the set of the intuitionistic ones a number of reductions that transform a classical proof into one in which eliminations of double negations are performed only on atomic propositions 8] . Working on the weak normalization property of this enlarged set of rules (proved in 8]), Prawitz managed to get the consistency for classical logic as well. As for what concerns the strong normalization property, a sketchy proof was given by Prawitz in 9], while a complete and detailed proof can instead be found in 1]. The use of the new reductions for classical logic was merely technical and no interpretation was provided for them. There is another interesting use of the above mentioned extended set of reductions: a computational one. Even if it can hardly be thought of as a realistic one for classical logic, which is typically non-constructive, the possibility of such a use has been known for a long time. In 5] Kreisel, by means of his no counterexample interpretation for classical proofs, showed that classical and intuitionistic provability coincide if we consider only 0 1 -sentences. Later on Friedman 3] enforced Kreisel's result by providing a translation from classical to intuitionistic proofs of 0 1 -sentences. The outcome of the above mentioned results is then that also classical logic has computational features. However, in order to reach a full understanding of it and to be able to use such computational features in practice, you should also devise methods to directly extract the constructive contents of proofs of 0 1 -sentences, a thing not provided by Kreisel and Friedman's results. It would be nice, and desirable indeed, if normalizability for natural deduction also provided such a method for classical logic. In fact it is like this: in 1] it was proved that, by normalizing classical proofs with respect to Prawitz's reductions for classical logic, you can manage to exploit Kreisel's no counterexample interpretation, and extract the constructive contents, i.e. witnesses, from classical proofs of 0 1 -sentences. By allowing free variables in proofs it is also easy to get functions out of classical proofs of 0 2 -sentences. The \extraction by normalization" method of 1], as recalled in Section 3, however, cannot be counted as a real success in the improvement of the understanding of the constructive features of classical logic, unless it can be explained in the setting of a clear computational interpretation of classical natural deduction; in particular, of Prawitz's reductions for classical logic. Providing such an interpretation is what this paper aims at. As a matter of fact, any technical mathematical result cannot really provide any actual improvement in the understanding of a topic until it is correctly interpreted.
In the classical case, the BHK interpretation for formulas and proofs cannot be applied. Let us see why. By the fact that the BHK interpretation of the intuitionistic falsehood (?) is the empty set, we get that the interpretation of :A ( A ! ?) is empty in the case in which the interpretation of A is inhabited. If, instead, the interpretation of A is empty, then the interpretation of :A consists of the sole function from the empty set to the empty set. Then it follows that the interpretation of ::A( :A ! ?) consists of at most one element. Any function from a set with at most one element is constant. Thus the classical axiom ::A ! A should be interpreted, from BHK's viewpoint, as a constant function from (the interpretation of ) ::A to (the interpretation of) A, i.e. as an e ective way to pick an element of a non-empty A, uniformly on A. One can easily see, however, that such a choice function can hardly be computable. Then a constructive interpretation of Classical Logic has necessarily to give a meaning di erent from BHK's one to the classical falsehood ?. The connectiveŝ and 8 can instead be given the BHK interpretation, while the connectives :, !, _ and 9 can be de ned from the previous ones, once an interpretation of ? is provided.
In order to nd an interpretation for the classical ? we ask ourselves the following question: \what is the rôle of ? in classical proofs?" While intuitionistic logic is essentially concerned with the notion of provability, classical logic deals with the notion of truth. Hence, in a proof A 1 A 2 : : : A n . . . ? (1) the meaning of ? is that it is not possible to assume consistently all the premises A 1 ; A 2 ; : : : ; A n , i.e. that any model satisfying all of such formulas cannot be a consistent one. This remains valid even through double negation elimination. In other words (1) can be seen as a particular way to build inconsistent models out of models for the formulas A 1 ; A 2 ; : : : A n . Hence ? could be rightly interpreted as the set of all inconsistent models. We can be even more general and consider models not completely speci ed (partial models henceforth). From this more general point of view, the interpretation of ? turns out to be the set of all inconsistent partial models. Once given this interpretation for ? we can extend it to all the formulas. A formula A can be seen as the set of the partial models satisfying it and, as for ?, a proof of it is a way of building one of these models. Conjunction is now an operator on partial models: if v 1 is an element of A 1 and v 2 of A 2 , then v 1 + v 2 (the \union" of the models) is an element of A 1^A2 . The elements of a negation :A are now the ones which cannot be elements of A, i.e. those that turn out to belong to the interpretation of ? once they are put together with elements of A. In this way the negation turns out to have a Kripke semantics.
In a sense, an element of :A can be seen as a function that returns an element of ? when it is applied to an element of A. That is, :A can be also considered as A ! ?, giving to \!" its BHK interpretation.
We shall formalize the above interpretation in a way similar to that in which Martin-L of formalized the computational interpretation of constructive logic into his Type Theory 7] . So we will de ne a system (VS ) for classical logic which is essentially a decoration of usual classical natural deduction. The rules of VS describe, for each connective, how to \build" and \use" the elements belonging to the interpretation of formulas having the considered connective as the main one. As in Martin-L of's Type Theory, our system will deal with judgements about logical formulas and elements of their interpretation, i.e. partial models. A partial model can be seen as a set of \assertions" stating the truth (t:P ) or falsity (f:P ) of closed atomic formulas. Such sets of assertions will be called valuations and denoted by valuation terms: v; v 0 ; : : :. Formally, our judgements will be expressions of the form v j = :A ( being t or f). A constructive interpretation, stronger than the natural \the valuation (denoted by v) forces :A", will be provided for such judgments. In particular, we shall interpret v j = t:P, for P atomic, as \it is possible to get a nite subvaluation of v such that the conjunction of its assertions implies t:P". The remaining cases will be interpreted as in Kripke models, i. . Moreover, the logical rules can be interpreted in such a way that a proof in normal form of a judgment e ectively provides the constructive interpretation for the judgment. For 0 1 -sentences this interpretation provides a means to get witnesses. A closed derivation for a formula 9x:P (x), in our system, becomes a derivation for the judgment ; j = f:8x::P(x), ; denoting the empty valuation. Hence, a proof of such a judgment can be interpreted as a function that takes a valuation v 0 validating t:8x::P(x) and returns an inconsistent subvaluation of v 0 . If we managed to have v 0 to be the valuation consisting of all possible assertions f:P(t) we could get a nite inconsistent subvaluation ff :P(t 1 ); : : : ; f:P(t n )g. From that, we can obtain some witnesses for 9x:P (x), i.e. some t i 's such that P(t i ) holds.
We shall see that the witness extraction method, based on Prawitz's reductions, devised in 1], will provide a means to \feed" the proof of ; j = f:8x::P(x) on the particular valuation v 0 , and to compute on v 0 the function resulting from the interpretation of the proof. Thus our system and its constructive interpretation provide Prawitz's reductions for classical logic with a precise computational meaning. Besides, normalization can also be seen as a sort of compactness argument, producing a nite inconsistent valuation out of an in nite one.
Prawitz's usual natural deduction system for classical logic and his set of reduction rules will be recalled in Section 2. The witness extraction method devised in 1] will be described in Section 3. An example of witness extraction on a simple derivation will be given in Section 5. In section 4, we shall present the \valuation interpretation" of classical natural deduction, i.e. our system VS . In Subsection 4.2 we shall show how, in our valuations setting, each inference rule has a computational meaning. Each of Prawitz's reduction rule will be shown in Subsection 4.3 to make explicit our interpretation of classical logical connectives and proofs. The extraction procedure of 1] will then be interpreted in the context of our valuation system in Subsection 4.4. An incomplete and preliminary version of the present paper was presented in 2].
2 Natural Deduction for Classical logic and Prawitz's reduction rules
In this section we recall the system of Natural Deduction for Classical Logic 8] and the set of reduction rules devised by Prawitz.
Natural Deduction Classical Logic
:A]
. . . When talking of witness extraction we will assume to be concerned with such extended systems.
We now present Prawitz's reduction rules for classical logic 8] which we divide into two sets. Prawitz It is easy to see that the reductions of the second set move the applications of the double negation elimination rule to simpler and simpler formulas. Prawitz used the normalizability of his set of rules in order to derive the consistency property of various systems. In the next section we shall see that, by means of the trivial reduction and Lemma 2.1, normalizability can be also used for computational purposes.
Witness Extraction
According to the BHK interpretation, an intuitionistic proof can provide constructive evidence for the formula it proves, by means of various extraction procedure. In a sense, then, a proof can be interpreted as being an example for the formula. This interpretation, as discussed in the introduction, is not possible for classical proofs. Kreisel, however, proposed for classical logic what he called no counterexample interpretation. A classical proof in it is interpreted as the record of an unsuccessful attempt to describe a counterexample for the statement it proves. Even more, it can be seen as something that is able to refute any claimed counterexample (see, for instance, 10] 8.4). For . This procedure will be outlined below and it makes essential use of the normalization property of Prawitz's reductions.
The witness extraction procedure of 1] Let us assume to have a closed derivation D of 9x:P (x) (:8x::P (x)) where P is a decidable predicate.
We rst add the following (non-logical) atomic rule to our system. r) P(
? :
1 Indeed in 1] a stronger result is proved, namely that it is possible to get a witness from proofs of 0 1 -sentences in Higher-Order Classical Logic.
From that it is possible to get a closed proof for 8x::P (x):
:P (x) 8x::P (x) It is now possible to get a closed proof for ?, as follows.
Such a derivation can be put in normal form by where t is now necessarily a witness for 9x:P (x), since P(t) is derived only by using atomic axioms and rules di erent from P(t) ? , since the derivation is normal with respect to the trivial reduction.
We wish to stress that e ciency is not a concern of the above extraction procedure. It was developed not in order to have a procedure more e cient, for instance, than the \dumb" extraction algorithm which takes a classical proof of a 0 1 -sentence and runs through all the possible terms searching for a correct instance of the matrix of the theorem. The interest of the procedure described above lies instead in the use of Prawitz's reductions for computational purposes and in the fact that it exploits, in a precise way, as shown below, Kreisel's no counterexample interpretation.
Interpretation of the procedure as no counterexample Kreisel's no counterexample interpretation of classical logic looks at a classical proof as the evidence of the fact that no counterexample can be given for a proved statement. The above extraction procedure exploits such an interpretation for 0 1 -formulas. Adding to the system the rule (r) above amounts to claiming to have an argument showing the inconsistency, for any t, of assuming P(t), that is exactly to claiming to have a counterexample for 9x:P (x). The derivation (2) shows that if you have a counterexample for 9x:P (x), it \contra-dicts" what the derivation D asserts. The normalization procedure, however, \destroys" the claimed counterexample, by providing a witness for our existentially quanti ed decidable predicate. The proof of 9x:P (x) behaves then, by means of the reduction rules, as a \non-counterexample". In Section 5 we shall give an example of witness extraction for a proof in classical natural deduction which uses a simple Post system.
The Valuation System for Classical Logic
The extraction procedure outlined above cannot be of much help by itself in improving our understanding of the computational features of classical logic. In order to be really of help, it should make explicit some computational interpretation of classical formulas and proofs, in the same way in which the -rule makes explicit the constructive meaning of the intuitionistic connective \!" in the BHK interpretation. We then need to give a precise computational meaning to Prawitz's reductions in the context of an interpretation of classical logic. The aim of the rest of the paper will be exactly that. Instead of simply logical formulas we shall consider judgments on formulas and valuations. These ones will be given a computational interpretation that will be shown to be preserved by the logical rules of natural deduction. Moreover, we shall see how Prawitz's reduction rules make explicit such computational interpretation implicitly contained in derivations.
The basis of our system of judgments are the notions of assertion and valuation. In a sense this system, called Valuations System (VS ), can be viewed as a formal system to reason about assertions and valuations.
Assertions. An assertion (on A) is an expression of the form t:A or of the form f:A, where A is a logical formula.
In what follows, will be a variable ranging over the set ft; fg, while is de ned in the following way = f if = t t if = f The intuitive meanings of the assertions t:A and f:A are \A is true" and \A is false", respectively. An assertion is in canonical form if it is not of the form t::A, f::A and no double negation is present. We will identify each formula with its equivalent canonical form, obtained by replacing t::A, f::A with f:A and t:A, respectively, and removing all double negations.
For instance, the canonical form of t::::(::A 1^: ::A 2 ) is f:A 1^: A 2 . Valuations.
Our system deals with classical validity of assertions in partial models (valuations) which can be seen as sets of assertions on atomic formulas.
A valuation is a set of assertions on atomic formulas.
To formally deal with valuations we need a syntax for them. A valuationterm is an expression that denotes a valuation, and it is formed by using the following rules. The niteness of a valuation term will be denoted by means of the subscript \ n".
If v is a nite valuation term, we shall denote by V v the formula consisting in the conjunction of its assertions (considering t:P as P and f:P as :P ).
In the following we shall equate the valuation-terms denoting the same valuation.
System VS
System VS is a system about valuations, more precisely about assertions validated by partial models represented by valuations. We have de ned above the terms of our valuation system: the valuation-terms. The well-formed formulas (judgments) of system VS are expressions of the following form: We now formally de ne the intended constructive meaning of our judgments. The rules of system VS are sound with respect to this intended meaning and the reduction rules will provide a means to make it explicit. In this sytem if we have two equal valuation terms or two equal assertions we can always substitute one for the other.
In the case we consider extensions of natural deduction with Post Systems, we have to extend system VS as follows: 
Interpretation of the deduction rules
The logical rules of system VS are clearly a decoration of those of Prawitz's usual natural deduction for classical logic, recalled in Section 2. The rules for valuations, instead, do not have any counterpart in Prawitz's system and have been introduced since they are needed if you wish to deal with valuations. Both of the above groups of rules, however, have a precise interpretation in terms of the intended meaning of the formulas in our valuation system. Furthermore the rules e ectively show how to get the intended meaning of the conclusion if we have the one of the premises.
For the axiom ft:P j x 1 ; : : : x n g j = t:P(t 1 ; : : : ; t n ) it is easy to see that, if t 1 ; : : : ; t n are closed, then ft:P (t 1 ; : : : ; t n )g is the nite valuation which satis es the formula on the right.
The most interesting rule is obviously ff :P j x 1 ; : : : ; x n g. So the interpretation of v j = t:A seems to be justi ed by the rule. There is however a case yet to be considered in the argument above: A could be a non-atomic formula. This, however, is not a di cult obstacle to overcome since we can always transform a deduction in such a way that double negation elimination is performed only on atomic formulas. This sort of transformation is exactly the one performed by Prawitz's reductions, which then manage to make explicit the constructive contents of the elimination of double negation. Later on we shall deal with the interpretation of Prawitz's reductions.
For what concerns the rules for introducing and eliminating^and 8 it is clear how they make evident the intended meaning of the formulas in their conclusions. According to our interpretation, by the fact that :A is equivalent to ::A, it can be interpreted as two di erent applications according to which one of the two subproofs is seen as the function. Alternatively, it can be seen as a symmetric form of application. Now we state the almost immediate formal equivalence between our valuation calculus VS and classical natural deduction. Proof. By induction on derivations. 2 
Reduction Rules for System VS
It is quite straightforward to extend Prawitz's reduction rules for classical natural deduction to system VS . The former ones, as brie y discussed in subsection 3, enable us to extract constructive contents from proofs of 0 1 -sentences. We have seen, in the previous subsection, that the double negation elimination rule has no explicit constructive meaning when applied to non-atomic formulas. Prawitz's reductions for double negation elimination enable us to transform a proof in such a way that such rules are applied only to atomic formulas, and hence to get proofs containing deduction rules all of them having explicit constructive meaning, with respect to our interpretation of judgments.
What it is said above gives a constructive sense to the normalization process as a whole. What is still lacking is a computational interpretation of the single steps of the process, i.e. of the single reduction rules. Then we need to show how each reduction rule makes more and more explicit our interpretation of the classical logical connectives in the partial models interpretation.
Prawitz's reductions are divided into two groups: those eliminating detours and those simplifying the structure of formulas to which double negation elimination rule is applied. The former ones mantain also in the VS setting their meaning of \simpli cation". In fact, we have seen that the rule The rules peculiar to classical logic, and to which no computational interpretation has ever been given, are the ones dealing with double negation elimination. A double negation elimination rule can be seen as a process to get the intended meaning of the conclusion only in the case its formula is atomic. Then, if in a proof the conclusion of an application of the double negation elimination rule is a compound formula, we can \decompose" it, in the case it is a conjunction, using the following rule. has been obtained by means of a double negation elimination. Its meaning is then \hidden", and has to be made explicit.
The reduction rule above, in fact, makes v j = t:A 1^A2 derived out of two derivations, one for v j = t:A 1 and one for v j = t:A 2 , so enabling us to interpret the derivation of v j = t:A 1^A2 as a pair. Of course, the pair obtained is a pair of constructive meanings only in the case the conjuncts are atomic, otherwise we have to perform other reduction steps to get to their atomic components.
An argument similar to the previous one can explain the computational meaning of Prawitz's reduction rule for double negation elimination on universally quanti ed formulas. This reduction has the following form in the context of system VS . Let us assume to have a closed proof in classical logic of 9x:P (x) ( :8x::P (x)).
By the Validity Theorem it is possible to get a derivation of ; j = f:8x::P(x) in system VS . According to our interpretation, the proof of this statement can be looked at as a function that, whenever it is applied to a valuation v 0 validating t:8x::P(x), returns a nite subvaluation of v 0 from which falsehood can be derived, i.e. an inconsistent one. It is clear that if v 0 ff :P j xg then we would have also the possibility of getting a witness for the statement 9x:P (x), since in the nite subvaluation ff :P(t 1 ); : : : f:P(t n )g we would get out of v 0 , one of the t i 's is necessarily a witness.
The problem is now how to \feed" ; j = f:8x::P(x) on the valuation ff :P j xg. This could be done in the following way:
. . .
; j = f:8x::P(x) D ff :P j xg j = t:8x::P(x) inc(ff:P j xg) in the case you had a derivation D for ff :P j xg j = t:8x::P(x). It is easy to see, however, that this is not possible since it would imply to have the possibility of getting 8x::P (x) from a nite subvaluation of ff :P j xg. We had a similar problem in Section 3 where, by interpreting the proof of 9x:P (x) as a counterexample destructor, we had to \feed" it on a counterexample. We decided there to add the rule r) P(x)
; which can be interpreted as the claim of having a counterexample.
Here we can provide the derivation of ; j = f:8x::P(x), interpreted as a function, with the valuation ff :P j xg, by adding a rule to system VS which corresponds to the rule (r) above, i.e. the following one:
r V S ) v j = t:P(x) inc(v + ff :P j xg) : By following our interpretation for VS expressions, such a rule says that it is possible to get a nite inconsistent valuation out of the valuation v + ff :P j xg for any valuation v validating t:P(x). The \application" of ; j = f:8x::P(x) to the valuation ff :P j xg can now be performed in VS as follows. v j = t:P(x)] inc(v + ff :P j xg)
. . . ff :P j xg j = t::P(x) ; j = f:8x::P(x) ff :P j xg j = t:8x::P(x) inc(ff:P j xg)
In Section 3, by means of rule (r), we managed to get ?, i.e. only the information that something inconsistent had been added to the system. We knew, from outside the system, that such an inconsistency depended on rule (r) and that necessarily there had to be some inconsistent P(t 1 ); : : : ; P(t n ). System VS , instead, is more informative than the bare natural deduction. Here formulas have a constructive interpretation, as seen in previous section. In particular, in the present case we have managed to derive a more precise information than simply the presence of an inconsistency: we have derived inc(ff:P j xg), i.e. the information that a nite subset of ff :P j xg is inconsistent. The information that there are some inconsistent P(t 1 ); : : : ; P(t n ) has been now internalized.
The reduction rules of the system enable us to explicitely get a nite subset ff :P j xg. In fact, Lemma 2.1 holds clearly for system VS as well, if rules for valuations are not used in a derivation. So, a normal form of the above derivation has necessarily to be of the shape r V S )
. . . ; j = t:P(t) inc(ff:P j xg) where . . . ; j = t:P(t) is a derivation made of atomic axioms and rules only. So ff :P(t)g is an inconsistent nite subvaluation of ff :P j xg; and then the term t is a witness of 9x:P (x), since, by Lemma 2.1, ; j = t:P(t) is obtained using only atomic axioms and atomic rules.
Let us notice that in system VS we could have done without introducing rule (r V S ), since such a rule is derivable, as shown by the deduction below. v j = t:P(x) ff :P j xg j = f:P(x) inc(v + ff :P j xg)
We made the choice of adding rule (r V S ), however, in order to be also able to pro t of Lemma 2.1 for system VS .
The derivability of rule (r V S ) in VS is not in contradiction with the fact that rule (r), which we had added to the system of natural deduction in Section 3, is, obviously, not derivable in the latter system. Rule (r V S ) is weaker than (r). In fact, by means of it we managed to derive inc(ff:P j xg), a thing more informative, and hence weaker, than the ? of bare natural deduction.
5 A simple example of use of Prawitz's reductions.
We provide now a concrete example of the use of the witness extraction procedure discussed in Section 3 on a simple derivation in natural deduction. At the end we shall give a hint about how such example could be carried on (and better understood) in system VS .
Let us assume to extend rst order classical logic with a Post System containing the axiom P(0). If we consider \6 =" as an atomic predicate, P(0) could be, for instance, the formula 0 6 = 1 as it is used in Peano's axiomatization of classical arithmetic. Let us consider now the following weird proof of the statement 9x:P (x) ( :8x::P (x)). We now proceed to normalize the above proof according to our reduction rules. To save space we begin by normalizing the subderivation D. In D we have double negation elimination applied to :(:P (1)^P (0)). We can use the reduction which modi es the deduction in such a way that the double negation elimination rule is applied to simpler formulas, namely ::P (1) and :P (0). In the above derivation, the negation :8x::P (x) is introduced, and the rule for its elimination applied. To get rid of such a \detour" we can apply the corresponding reduction. We have still one more \detour" for the negation to get rid of. At last we got a deduction which is normal with respect to Prawitz's reduction. We can now apply the trivial reduction.
P(0)
? P
?
One more trivial reduction can be applied, getting a deduction in normal form with respect to both Prawitz's reductions and the trivial one.
The witness we were looking for is then 0. The derivation for P(0) consists here simply in an axiom because of the simplicity of our example, given for explanatory motivation. If we had a more complex Post System we could have more complex atomic derivations for the atomic predicate displaying the witness.
It is easy to see that we could use the example presented above in the setting of system VS . In such a case our initial proof of :8x::P (x) could be easily decorated in order to get a proof in VS of ; j = f:8x:P(x). By adding to the system the rule (r PV ), as described in Subsection 4.4, we manage to obtain, in a way similar to that to get ? above, a derivation for inc(ff:P j xg) which, according to our interpretation, can be seen as a nite inconsistent subvaluation of ff :P j xg. This inconsistent subvaluation, however, is only implicitly represented by the derivation. We can explicitly obtain it only by means of a normalization process. If we follows the same reduction steps described above, it is possible to obtain the derivation ; j = t:P(0) inc(ff:P j xg) which explicitly takes to the nite inconsistent subvaluation ff :P(0)g ff :P j xg.
Conclusions
We have developed a formal system (VS ) for classical logic, whose well-formed formulas are \judgments" of the form v j = :A, informally stating that the \par-tial model" denoted by the term v \validates" the \assertion" :A, where is t or f. A precise constructive interpretation has been given to such judgments, depending on the main connective of A. Such an interpretation is respected by the deduction rules of the system. Moreover, a derivation which is normal with respect to Prawitz's reductions for classical logic, can be interpreted as an e ective evidence for the interpretation of the judgment it proves. Then Prawitz's reduction rules for classical logic turn out tobe given a precise computational meaning, by means of our interpretation of proofs and judgments. This computational meaning was only implicit in the procedure of witness extraction from classical proofs of 0 1 -formulas devised in 1]. Finally, the witness extraction procedure of 1] has been looked at from the perspective of our interpretation.
